| Hafta | Konu | Ön Hazırlık | Dökümanlar |
| 1 |
1. Introduction:
(a) Tax design and information
(b) The role of the government in a market economy: brief reminder
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| 2 |
i. Welfare theorems
ii. Market failures
iii. Redistribution
iv. Paternalism
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| 3 |
2. Taxation and efficiency (Auerbach and Hines, Section 2)
(a) Deadweight loss of taxation: definition and measurement
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| 4 |
(b) Illustrations:
i. Partial equilibrium, single competitive market
ii. Single household, two goods
iii. Labor supply, savings, etc.
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| 5 |
3. Optimal commodity taxation (GM, Ch. 4; Atkinson and Stiglitz, Ch. 12; Auerbach and Hines, Sections 3-5)
(a) Introduction
(b) Identical individuals
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| 6 |
(c) Heterogenous households
(d) Ramsey-Boiteux prices
(e) Application: access pricing in the postal sector
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| 7 |
Optimal income taxation (MT, Ch. 2–4, Stiglitz (1987))
(a) Introduction: income tax schedules (tax functions), marginal and average tax rates, progressivity
(b) Linear income tax
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Optimal income taxation (MT, Ch. 2–4, Stiglitz (1987))
(a) Introduction: income tax schedules (tax functions), marginal and average tax rates, progressivity
(b) Linear income tax
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| 8 |
(c) Non-linear income tax
(d) Applications and special cases
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(c) Non-linear income tax
(d) Applications and special cases
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| 9 |
5. Income vs. commodity taxation (MT, Ch.12; Stiglitz (1987); Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001))
(a) Introduction: the direct vs. indirect tax controversy
(b) The Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) result (non-linear and linear commodity taxes)
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5. Income vs. commodity taxation (MT, Ch.12; Stiglitz (1987); Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001))
(a) Introduction: the direct vs. indirect tax controversy
(b) The Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) result (non-linear and linear commodity taxes)
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| 10 |
c) Attacks on AS
(d) Multi-dimensional heterogeneity and the design of tax policy: an example
(e) Other instruments: social insurance, in-kind transfers, taxation of capital, etc.
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c) Attacks on AS
(d) Multi-dimensional heterogeneity and the design of tax policy: an example
(e) Other instruments: social insurance, in-kind transfers, taxation of capital, etc.
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| 11 |
6. Taxation of families and couples and gender policies (Cremer, Lozachmeur, Maldonado and Roeder, 2016; Cremer, Lozachmeur and Roeder, 2017)
(a) Introduction: unitary vs collective couple
(b) Income taxation
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6. Taxation of families and couples and gender policies (Cremer, Lozachmeur, Maldonado and Roeder, 2016; Cremer, Lozachmeur and Roeder, 2017)
(a) Introduction: unitary vs collective couple
(b) Income taxation
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| 12 |
c) Commodity taxes: the tax treatment of male and female goods (Mademoiselle Coco and tampons vs. Fishing equipment)
(d) Gender wage gap, optimal taxation and child care policies
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c) Commodity taxes: the tax treatment of male and female goods (Mademoiselle Coco and tampons vs. Fishing equipment)
(d) Gender wage gap, optimal taxation and child care policies
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| 13 |
7. Externalities and optimal taxation (Salanié, Ch. 10)
(a) Introduction: …rst-best results
(b) Environmental taxation in second-best
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7. Externalities and optimal taxation (Salanié, Ch. 10)
(a) Introduction: …rst-best results
(b) Environmental taxation in second-best
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| 14 |
(c) Linear taxation: Sandmo’s analysis
(d) General taxation: Cremer and Gahvari
i. Taxation of …nal goods
ii. Taxation of inputs and emissions
(e) Empirical illustration: taxation of energy
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(c) Linear taxation: Sandmo’s analysis
(d) General taxation: Cremer and Gahvari
i. Taxation of …nal goods
ii. Taxation of inputs and emissions
(e) Empirical illustration: taxation of energy
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