| Week | Topics | Study Materials | Materials |
| 1 |
1. Introduction:
(a) Tax design and information
(b) The role of the government in a market economy: brief reminder
i. Welfare theorems
ii. Market failures
iii. Redistribution
iv. Paternalism
|
|
|
| 2 |
2. Taxation and efficiency (Auerbach and Hines, Section 2)
(a) Deadweight loss of taxation: definition and measurement
(b) Illustrations:
i. Partial equilibrium, single competitive market
ii. Single household, two goods
iii. Labor supply, savings, etc.
|
|
|
| 3 |
3. Optimal commodity taxation (GM, Ch. 4; Atkinson and Stiglitz, Ch. 12; Auerbach and Hines, Sections 3-5)
(a) Introduction
(b) Identical individuals
(c) Heterogenous households
(d) Ramsey-Boiteux prices
(e) Application: access pricing in the postal sector
|
|
|
| 4 |
Optimal income taxation (MT, Ch. 2–4, Stiglitz (1987))
(a) Introduction: income tax schedules (tax functions), marginal and average tax rates, progressivity
(b) Linear income tax
|
|
|
| 5 |
(c) Non-linear income tax
(d) Applications and special cases
|
|
|
| 6 |
Income vs. commodity taxation (MT, Ch.12; Stiglitz (1987); Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001))
(a) Introduction: the direct vs. indirect tax controversy
(b) The Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) result (non-linear and linear commodity taxes)
|
|
|
| 7 |
(c) Attacks on AS
(d) Multi-dimensional heterogeneity and the design of tax policy: an example
(e) Other instruments: social insurance, in-kind transfers, taxation of capital, etc.
|
|
|
| 8 |
6. Taxation of families and couples and gender policies (Cremer, Lozachmeur, Maldonado and Roeder, 2016; Cremer, Lozachmeur and Roeder, 2017)
(a) Introduction: unitary vs collective couple
|
|
|
| 9 |
(b) Income taxation
(c) Commodity taxes: the tax treatment of male and female goods (Mademoiselle Coco and tampons vs. Fishing equipment)
|
|
|
| 10 |
(d) Gender wage gap, optimal taxation and child care policies
|
|
|
| 11 |
Externalities and optimal taxation (Salanié, Ch. 10)
(a) Introduction: …rst-best results
(b) Environmental taxation in second-best
|
|
|
| 12 |
(c) Linear taxation: Sandmo’s analysis
(d) General taxation: Cremer and Gahvari
i. Taxation of …nal goods
ii. Taxation of inputs and emissions
|
|
|
| 13 |
(e) Empirical illustration: taxation of energy
|
|
|
| 14 |
8. Social insurance and optimal taxation (Rochet, 1991, Cremer and Pestieau, 1996, Cremer and Roeder, 2017)
(a) The role of social insurance with perfect private insurance markets
(b) Social insurance with adverse selection in private markets
|
|
|